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Abstract—Cloud computing offers many advantages as flexibil-
ity or resource efficiency and can significantly reduce costs. 
However, when sensitive data is outsourced to a cloud provid-
er, classified records can leak. To protect data owners and 
application providers from a privacy breach data must be en-
crypted before it is uploaded. In this work, we present a dis-
tributed key management scheme that handles user-specific 
keys in a single-tenant scenario. The underlying database is 
encrypted and the secret key is split into parts and only recon-
structed temporarily in memory. Our scheme distributes 
shares of the key to the different entities. We address boot-
strapping, key recovery, the adversary model and the resulting 
security guarantees. 
Keywords-key management; key distribution; cloud security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When personal data (e.g. medical records) is processed it 
is often imperative from a legal standpoint to guarantee con-
fidentiality (e.g Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, General 
Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 etc.). For many 
small and medium-sized enterprises cloud computing is an 
attractive alternative compared to operating an own data cen-
ter. However, if sensitive data is handled by an untrusted 
third party like a cloud provider it is not trivial to ensure pri-
vacy of sensitive information. 
The main adversary is an insider, e.g. a cloud administra-
tor that has high privileges. To prevent a leak of personal 
identifiable data we use a database proxy This proxy acts as 
an adapter between the application and untrusted storage 
providers and encrypts all outgoing data transparently to the 
application side. We focus on using symmetric encryption 
(e.g. AES [3]) because speed is required for practicability. 
Independent of which outsourcing scheme is used, the en-
cryption and decryption algorithm needs a secret key. This 
paper addresses the major issues of key handling and storage 
in a distributed system. 
We assume that data in the cloud is persisted (stored) on-
ly in encrypted form but need to be processed unencrypted. 
Furthermore, we assume that all connections are secured on 
transport level with transport-layer security (TLS) [4]. The 
main focus of this paper is on handling the key used to en-
crypt the outsourced database as well as on authorization of 
the legitimate user. 
To minimize the attack potential, the encryption key is 
broken into fragments and not persistently stored as a whole. 
The fragments are distributed between the application, the 
users and the proxy. The cloud storage provider is used only 
as a storage back-end and is not required to participate in the 
key management. Our key management scheme protects the 
database’s confidentiality even if the key shares of an arbi-
trary number of users and the application are compromised 
and does not rely on heavy tools like a global PKI for user 
keys. This allows for a very lightweight deployment. 
A. Related Work 
One alternative to our approach is to store the secret key 
in the cloud itself. In this case the cloud provider is responsi-
ble for key storage and handling of encryption end decryp-
tion. The obvious upside is simplicity and transparency to the 
application. Amazon Web Services (AWS) [7] works like 
this; the user is not even able to obtain the secret key. In our 
model this approach is not applicable because we assume the 
application cloud provider cannot be trusted to handle 
plaintext data and the key. More along the lines of our work 
is the use of a key server which provides a trusted party like 
the database proxy with the encryption key when needed. 
However, this introduces the necessity of operating another 
component whose security must be ensured at all times [8] 
[9]. 
A completely different approach is called “Sealed 
Cloud”, where encryption keys are stored at the cloud pro-
vider’s premises, albeit in volatile memory only. By tech-
nical and organizational measures it is ensured that data and 
keys are erased as soon as (legitimate) administrative access 
to the server, possibly allowing to recover the key, is needed 
[10]. 
We build on top of an existing outsourcing scheme that 
relies on a single tenant key (TK). It was first introduced in 
the MimoSecco [1] and Cumulus4j [2] projects and further 
developed in PaaSword [5]. The key can be stored in secure 
hardware (MimoSecco [1]), on a dedicated key server (Cu-
mulus4j [2]) or integrated (PaaSword [6]). 
B. Contribution and Paper Structure 
Our contribution is a simple, yet powerful distributed key 
management scheme that enables for transparent encryption 
of sensitive data. This scheme was introduced in a previous 
publication [6]. Here we detail the functionality of the com-
ponents and define the needed interfaces. Additionally, we 
reconsider the establishment of trust during the bootstrapping 
© 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including 
reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, 
or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. 
The original IEEE publication can be found here: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8104307/ ; DOI: 10.1109/CBMS.2017.151 
phase and argue about the security of the scheme relative to 
an adversarial model we provide. 
This work is structured as follows. Chapter II explains 
the underlying model for key management and introduces the 
entities that contribute to the scheme. The basic idea of key 
splitting and distribution is described. Chapter III explains in 
more detail how certain mechanisms, especially bootstrap-
ping, key usage and recovery work. Chapter IV provides an 
attacker model and a security analysis. Chapter V concludes. 
II. KEY MANAGEMENT MODEL 
The PaaSword approach is based on an architecture that 
separates the Application (A) where the data is processed 
from the DB Proxy (P) whose task is to store and access the 
data in a cloud database on behalf of A when authorized by a 
User (Ui) (see Figure 2). 
The key management for data access shall avoid specific 
secure hardware. For security reasons, TK to access the da-
tabase shall not be stored at P, where it would be beyond the 
tenant’s control. On the other hand, the approach shall avoid 
the necessity of running a key server at the tenant side. Fur-
thermore, TK shall not be available at A, so the application 
or its administrator cannot access the data at all times. In 
addition, no individual user should have TK, due to the high 
risk of losing the key or theft, especially if mobile devices 
(smartphone, tablet, laptop) are used. If a user had TK, 
he/she would be able to access the database directly; bypass-
ing the access control mechanism of A if he/she got direct 
access to the cloud database. In addition, we need one key 
per tenant, to share access to the data to all users authorized 
by the tenant. 
To fulfil all the requirements mentioned above, the ap-
proach of PaaSword is to split up the key in three parts and 
give one part to each Ui, one part to A and one part to P. 
Therefore, TK is split up in three parts TKu, TKa and TKp 
such that  
TK = TKu  TKa  TKp 
where ⊕ is the bit-wise XOR function. The user gets 
TKu, the application TKa and the DB Proxy TKp. Only if 
they work together they can reconstruct TK to access the 
database. 
To have the ability to withdraw the access possibility for 
an individual user or to change the user part (TKu) of TK 
(e.g. it is lost or stolen) without affecting any other user it is 
necessary to have user individual triple sets of TK. There-
fore, TK is split up for every individual Ui in a way that:  
TK = TKu1  TKa1  TKp1  
 = TKu2  TKa2  TKp2  
 = TKu3  TKa3  TKp3  
 = … 
To create those user individual key triples, the tenant key 
TK is handled as a bit-string, the length of TK is l. For each 
user Ui, initially two uniformly random bit-strings, e.g., TKai 
and TKpi , of length l are chosen. Then the third key, e.g., 
TKui is computed as  
TKui = TK ⊕ TKai ⊕ TKpi . 
It is irrelevant which two keys are random and which is 
computed from the other two and TK. 
A. Key Management Setup 
To set up this scenario, the process shown in Figure 1 is 
used during bootstrapping time. P creates the encrypted da-
tabase (with key TK), hands TK to the Tenant Admin and 
deletes TK from its memory. The Tenant Admin splits up 
TK for every user as described above. He keeps TK and all 
TKui in a safe place in case a recovery is necessary. After-
wards the Tenant Admin distributes the individual TKui to 
every Ui, all the TKai to A and all the TKpi to P. The distri-
bution to A and P is secured with transport encryption and 
two-sided authorization, the TKpi are additionally encrypted 
and signed to prevent access or changes by A. When the set-
up is finished, the Tenant Admin should go offline to protect 
him from online attacks. He is only needed again in case of 
recovery or to add / change user. 
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Figure 1.  Setup of the Key Management Mechanism [6] 
B. Key Management During Runtime 
Figure 2 shows the key management mechanism during 
runtime. Ui encrypts his individual part of the key (TKui) 
together with a timestamp using the public key of P (referred 
to as EncP(TKuiǁtime)) and adds it to his/her request to the 
application for processing data. A controls the permission of 
the user to process the data and if it is granted A can use 
EncP(TKuiǁtime) and its own user specific part of the applica-
tion key (TKai) to request the necessary database operations 
from P. P decrypts EncP(TKuiǁtime) and controls the 
timestamp. If the timestamp is within the validity period, it 
reconstructs TK = TKui  TKai  TKpi, checks the validity 
of TK and does the requested database operation. Afterwards 
P wipes TK out of its memory. 
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Figure 2.  Key Management Mechanism during Runtime [6], modified 
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III. COMPONENTS AND TASKS OF THE KEY 
MANAGEMENT MECHANISM 
The UML Component Diagram of Figure 3 depicts the 
main components that comprise the key management mech-
anism. These components are further elaborated below. 
We assume that there is a (private or public) PKI for P 
and A. This also requires the possibility to perform a key 
rollover and revocation. Every instance (Ui, Tenant Admin, 
A, P) knows the public keys of P and A. Every connection 
between instances is encrypted and authenticated at the 
transport layer. For tenant isolation every tenant gets its own 
(virtual) DB Proxy (there is a 1:1 relation between tenants 
and DB Proxies) 
A. Bootstrapping 
We assume that the provider of A is also the service pro-
vider in contact with the customer (the tenant). Therefore, the 
provider of A initiates the process to bootstrap the Key Man-
agement. He creates a one-time password for authentication 
and orders a new P instance. The one-time password is added 
to the order. 
The provider of the newly-created P creates a key pair for 
the new proxy instance and gets a certificate from the PKI 
and deploys it to P. Afterwards P creates a secret TK for the 
database and creates the encrypted database with TK. Using 
TK, P creates a ciphertext of the message "0" and stores it in 
the database for validation of the temporarily reconstructed 
TK during runtime. Furthermore, an additional signature key 
pair for the Tenant App is created by the Tenant Certificate 
Management. 
Once P has been deployed, the provider of A notifies the 
Tenant Admin and passes him the one-time password (out of 
band!). 
The Tenant App, authenticating itself with the one-time 
password, obtains the private signature key and the symmet-
ric TK from P and stores them. Afterwards, TK is destroyed 
on P. The two interfaces between Tenant App and P are only 
needed once for bootstrapping and should be switched off 
afterwards. 
B. User creation 
We assume that every Ui has some code installed to add 
TKui to any request to A (called User App). This could be 
integrated in an application specific client or a local web 
proxy if a web browser is used as client application. The 
Tenant Admin uses the Tenant App to create a User-
Id (UIdi), user individual keys TKui, TKai, TKpi for every Ui 
and stores TK and all UIdi, TKui as described above. The 
user IDs UIdi and user keys TKui are distributed to every 
individual User App and all UIdi, TKai, TKpi are handed to 
A (TKpi timestamped, encrypted and signed). Therefore, the 
User Key Management within A offers an Interface for the 
Tenant App to add, change or withdraw a user and its keys. 
(Obviously the tenant admin has to authenticate with user 
credentials): 
 AddUser (UIdi, TKai, SigT(Encp(TKpiǁtime) ) ) 
 ChangeKey (UIdi, TKai, SigT(Encp(TKpiǁtime) ) ) 
 WithdrawUser (UIdi) 
The encrypted keys TKpi for P have added a timestamp 
and are signed by the Tenant App to avoid manipulation by 
the A administrator. UIdi, TKai are stored at A. UIdi, 
SigT(Encp(TKpiǁtime) ) ) are forwarded to the User Key 
Management of P where the signature is validated, 
Encp(TKpiǁtime) is decrypted and the timestamp is validated 
before UIdi and TKpi are stored. 
 
Figure 3.  Key Management Component Diagram [6], modified 
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C. Key Usage During Runtime 
During runtime, every request to process data from a Us-
er App X to A has added UIdx, EncP(TKuxǁTime). To per-
form one User App request it can be necessary to perform 
more than one database request. This makes it necessary that 
the validation of a User App request is valid for a short 
timeframe. A adds UIdx, EncP(TKuxǁTime) and its part of the 
key (TKax) to each database request which is needed to per-
form the user request. P decrypts EncP(TKuxǁTime) and 
checks the timestamp. If the timestamp is within the validity 
period, it reconstructs TK = TKux  TKax  TKpx, validates 
it against the stored (or cached) ciphertext of the message "0" 
and performs the requested database operation. Afterwards it 
wipes TK out of its memory. 
D. Key Recovery and Renewal 
In a distributed architecture several entities can lose keys 
or be corrupted. Our scheme can cope with such data losses 
and attacks as long as the tenant admin is not affected. The 
most likely case is that a user Ui loses his key part TKui. 
Since the tenant admin is physically near the user, recovery 
is very simple. After proper identification, the tenant admin 
gives the user a copy of TKui that he has stored. 
If a user key TKui is compromised it is also very simple 
for the tenant admin to create a new set of key parts for user 
Ui replacing the old ones. Creation of new key triples is the 
same process as for the initial user creation, except that an 
existing UIdi is chosen and a different interface to A is used 
to indicate an update instead. 
The only non-trivial case is when A or P gets compro-
mised and recovered or loses user keys. The goal is to allow 
the users to keep their keys and only change the keys for the 
application and the proxy while TK remains the same. If it is 
necessary to have only new key parts for A and P the Tenant 
Admin is able to create new TKai and TKpi with the Tenant 
App without the need to change the user keys TKui. They 
can be calculated by the knowledge of TK and TKui which 
are stored. The process is nearly the same as for the User 
creation, except that an existing UIdi is chosen, no new user 
keys TKui are created and distributed and the calculation 
process differs slightly. 
IV. ADVERSARY MODEL AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In the context of distributed database outsourcing with 
confidentiality and integrity (in the sense that an adversary 
should not be able to make changes to the outsourced data-
base) as goals, security has to be considered at different plac-
es and layers.  
A. Protecting the Tenant Key 
The overall goal of our database outsourcing scheme is to 
protect the confidentiality of the outsourced data, which is 
achieved by only storing data encrypted with TK at the hon-
est-but-curious cloud provider. 
As P holds TK during operation which could, if an adver-
sary had access to the encrypted database, completely break 
the database’s confidentiality, several measures have to be 
taken in order to reduce the attack surface at P. As TK can be 
read from P’s memory during operation, P should be de-
ployed at a trustworthy location. If this is not possible, dif-
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Figure 4.  Key Management Bootstrapping 
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ferent providers for the Cloud DB and P should be chosen as 
a honest-but-curious cloud provider hosting both entities 
could easily extract the key from P and use it to decrypt the 
outsourced database. 
To minimize the possibility of key extractions, TK is on-
ly stored at P in volatile memory but never persisted. Fur-
thermore, the key gets deleted after requests have been pro-
cessed, protecting it during idle times. Consequently, the key 
is only vulnerable if P is compromised during query execu-
tion. Otherwise, TK is only persistently stored at the tenant. 
In order to reduce the attack surface of the Tenant App 
and P, their only communication after the setup phase is 
through A. The Tenant App’s commands are again protected 
with encryption, timestamps and signatures to prevent modi-
fications and replay attacks. After the initial deployment, the 
Tenant App is not operational and therefore offline, except 
when changes to Ui, A or P keys have to be made. Even then, 
we only allow unidirectional communication originating 
from the Tenant App.  
Due to the way TK is shared, even the simultaneous 
compromise of an arbitrary numbers of Ui and A does not 
leak TK as the user and application shares are information-
theoretically independent from TK without the appropriate 
shares of P. 
B. Bootstrapping Trust 
Apart from considering attacks during operation, we also 
have to consider the bootstrapping process when the trust is 
first established. In particular, we have to consider adver-
saries at the network level, i.e. adversaries which try to re-
play or modify packets or imitate other protocol parties. 
While the Tenant App can verify P’s identity by its certifi-
cate (assuming that the Tenant App knows the expected 
identity) for TLS, P has no way to verify the Tenant Admin’s 
identity. We solve this by having A pass a one-time pass-
word out-of-band to the Tenant Admin, which can then be 
used for authentication during the bootstrapping phase. 
During the bootstrapping phase, the Tenant App is pro-
vided with a signature key that can be used to authenticate its 
subsequent requests. Furthermore, the Tenant App is also 
given TK. This initial transfer is protected at the transport 
layer. 
C. Protecting Information in Transit 
During transit, sensitive non-key-related information 
such as user input, database queries and query results is 
transferred between the different entities. In order to protect 
such sensitive information during transit, we make use TLS 
throughout the protocol. When correctly used, TLS provides 
both confidentiality and integrity. Furthermore, it can be 
used to provide authentication of the communicating parties. 
In order to keep the deployment simple, we do not employ 
client certificates for TLS and thus only have authentication 
of the server (e.g. Ui or Tenant App can authenticate A at the 
transport level). Client authentication (e.g. authenticating Ui 
or the Tenant App from A’s perspective) is handled by 
standard access control mechanisms such as passwords. In 
order to protect user-key-related information from A, com-
munication is encrypted using the public key of P. 
D. Protecting Against Malicious Protocol Parties 
P can authenticate requests by checking if the accompa-
nying key shares can be re-combined to a valid TK, implicit-
ly authenticating the requesting Ui and A. 
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Figure 5.  Key Management: User creation 
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In the following, we assume that integrity and confidenti-
ality are always provided at the transport layer and now con-
sider compromised protocol parties, namely Ui and A. 
In the context of A, confidentiality and integrity can be 
interpreted as enforcing appropriate user permissions within 
the application that ensure that Ui is only able to access rec-
ords that he is supposed to and making only changes con-
sistent with his permissions. Generally, this is done by stand-
ard access control mechanisms as well as user authentication, 
e.g. by username and password. If desired, accountability 
could be achieved by logging the user’s actions. As a conse-
quence, login credentials have to be protected both at the 
client and server level and during transit. By assumption, the 
latter is done at the transport level. 
In order to provide stronger security guarantees (namely 
confidentiality of the database in the presence of a compro-
mised Ui or A), relying on access control alone is insufficient 
as the party authorizing the user would have to be in 
knowledge of the whole secret. By distributing the secret 
between Ui, A and P, confidentiality of the database is en-
sured as long as at most any two instances are compromised, 
as the key cannot be recovered from two shares only. Unfor-
tunately, splitting the user key does not protect the integrity 
if both Ui’s login credential as well as his TKui are compro-
mised as A cannot distinguish between an honest user and an 
adversary which is in possession of the correct credentials. 
Due to the fact that the actual database query is created at 
A, Ui has no way to cryptographically protect his intended 
action. Thus, a compromised A is always able to take a TKui 
(even if it’s encrypted) and use it to execute arbitrary SQL 
statements. This could in part be solved by moving part of 
the business logic to Ui, allowing him to verify the SQL 
statement created by A and sign it with a key known by P. 
However, this would break the overall application architec-
ture and require the additional distribution of a signature key 
pair to the user resp. the certification of user-created keys, 
increasing the deployment effort, which contradicts the de-
sign goal of an easy setup procedure at the tenant’s realm. 
Thus, this solution is out of scope. 
As A only controls all TKai, an adversary compromising 
A has to either obtain a TKui or use the user’s key-related 
input in an appropriate way to facilitate his actions. P’s pub-
lic key is distributed to Ui along with TKui, Ui is able to en-
crypt his share during transmission, protecting it from a pos-
sibly malicious A. In order to prevent replay attacks where A 
could try to use a ciphertext containing TKui multiple times, 
means such as counters or timestamps have to be taken. As 
we want to maintain as little state as possible at P, our ap-
proach makes use of timestamps whose validity can be easily 
checked. However, this requires synchronized clocks be-
tween Ui and P. Furthermore, there is an inherent delay be-
tween the creation of the ciphertext containing TKui and 
timestamp and the verification at P as the user’s action has to 
be processed at A, possibly requiring numerous complex 
SQL statements. Thus, the timestamp has to be valid for a 
certain period of time after its creation, which opens an at-
tack window for a malicious A. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We presented a distributed key management scheme that 
does not rely on secure hardware and provides additional 
security compared to existing systems (e.g. AWS). There is 
no need to maintain a dedicated key server since all partici-
pating entities already exist in our generic scenario. 
Future work will address extensions to our scheme that 
increase security. More fine-grained access by using table-
specific keys will result in better privacy because an attacker 
can only see a fragment of the data if he obtains a secret key. 
The exploitation of secure hardware or trusted computing 
environments (e.g. Intel SGX) can further increase security. 
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